\*NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File.\* DDI-2856-74 Approved For Belease 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80I004354000400040002-8

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET

September 27, 1974

## National Security Decision Memorandum 272

TO:

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of State

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing

Consultative Commission

SUBJECT:

Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing Consultative Commission, Geneva, September 24, 1974

The following instructions are approved for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on September 24, 1974 in Geneva.

## Instructions on Procedures Governing ABM Replacement

- 1. The U.S. Commissioner should undertake discussions on general approaches to procedures for replacement of operational ABM systems and their components. The objective of this discussion is to provide a framework for working out mutually agreed procedures at subsequent SCC sessions. The U.S. approach is that the procedures should be based on: (1) the agreed guidelines contained in the two "Protocols on Procedures" of July 3, 1974, (2) the ABM Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements, and (3) the Protocol to the ABM Treaty. The procedures should also be consistent with those procedures for dismantling and destruction previously agreed in the SCC, except as modified by these instructions.
- 2. The U.S. Commissioner should not put forth any proposals for specific procedures. However, he may discuss illustrative specific procedures in explaining and supporting the general U.S. approach. In so doing, he should draw on the material in the Verification Panel Working Group paper, "Criteria for An Approach to Replacement of Operational ABM Systems or Their Components," dated September 11, 1974.

TOP SECRET XGDS

TS# 203659 <del>CIA cy#1</del> #-3.200.**46** 

# TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T00435A0004400040002-8

- 3. The U.S. Commissioner should emphasize that the procedures to be negotiated must prevent the limits of the ABM Treaty and its Protocol from being exceeded during the replacement process as a result of overlapping operational capabilities, but must provide sufficient flexibility to permit an orderly replacement program.
- 4. Specifically, the U.S. Commissioner should seek to work out a mutually acceptable approach to:
- a. replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to the current ABM deployment areas.
- b. replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to the exchange of ABM deployment areas under the provisions of the Protocol to the ABM Treaty of July 3, 1974. The U.S. Commissioner should emphasize that the exchange of ABM deployment areas is of such a nature that the appropriate procedures would not necessarily be the same as those for the current ABM deployment areas.
- c. notification procedures consistent with the guidelines in the July 3, 1974, Protocol to the ABM Treaty as well as with the notification procedures for dismantling or destruction previously negotiated in the SCC. The U.S. Commissioner should seek to achieve notification procedures that include:
  - (1) the numbers, types, and locations of ABM components which are being replaced or which have been replaced,
  - (2) the numbers, types, and locations of replacement ABM components, and
  - (3) with respect to the exchange of ABM areas, the location of the new ABM deployment area.

Notification relating to replacement of components within existing ABM deployment areas should be provided at the beginning of regular SCC sessions.

d. determining when an ABM component is "under construction" and when dismantling or destruction of an ABM component must begin, both to be consistent with adequate verification requirements. The

#### TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 3

U.S. SCC Commissioner should emphasize that it may be appropriate to define "under construction" differently for different ABM components.

- e. dismantling or destruction procedures for replaced ABM systems or their components consistent with adequate verification requirements taking into account certain operational considerations, in particular in the exchange of ABM deployment areas. The U.S. SCC Commissioner should emphasize that while costs can also be taken into account, it should not be at the expense of any verification requirements.
- 5. Privacy of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are to be cleared at the White House.

# Clarification of the SCC Procedures Governing Dismantling or Destruction of Replaced Submarines

1. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the U.S. Commissioner should read into the record a statement along the following lines:

With respect to Paragraph III. 2 of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, the United States interpretation of this paragraph is that dismantling or destruction of replaced submarines may be accomplished at shipyards which carry out construction or repairs of submarines.

2. The U.S. Commissioner should seek formal Soviet agreement to the above interpretation.

### Pre-agreed Messages for Situations Covered by the Accidents Agreement

- 1. The President has approved the recommendations of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee with respect to initiating discussion of pre-agreed messages relating to the Accidents Agreement.
- 2. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the U.S. Commissioner should present for consideration the draft texts of the English language versions of the pre-agreed messages. As appropriate,

#### TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400040002-8

the U.S. Commissioner should draw on the draft Aide Memoire prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee in making this presentation.

Henry Al Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

	1U	NCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET				
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip										
тс	): [		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL				
	1	DCI		X						
	2	DDCI		Ж						
	3	S/MC								
٠.	4	DDS&T		Х	•					
	(5)	DDI		X	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
	6	DDM&S								
	7	DDO		Х						
	8	D/DCI/IC								
	9	D/DCI/NIO	,	X	· · · · · · ·					
	10	OGC								
	11	OLC	. 1.							
	12	IG								
	13	Compt				·				
	14	D/Pers								
	15	D/S								
	16	DTR								
	17	Asst/DCI								
	18	AO/DCI								
	19				19					
	20									
	21									
	22		•	<del></del>						
<b>.</b>		SUSPENSE			<u>-</u>					
	1 15		- D	ate						
Remar	ks:				i					
					•					
L										

	1.1	TO	P SECF	RET					
UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP fied when filled in ABM 3 Vacabled			\$		=			declassi-	
CONTROL AN	ID COVER	SHE	EŢ FC	OR TO	OP SECT	RET DOCUMEN	IT		
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	·····						REGISTRY		
SOURCE							CIA CONTROL NO.		
NSC						TS 203			
DOC. NO.					30 Sep 74				
COPY NO. Series C, #3			1			LOGGED BY			
NUMBER OF PAGES 4						0/DDI/			
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS						0,001,	6111 /		
None									
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on or classified Top Secret within the CIA transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Tog duties relate to the matter. Top Secret C and indicate period of custody in the left indicate the date of handling in the right	and will remo p Secret matte ontrol Officers t-hand column	iin atto er is lir who re es provi	ached to mited to eceive and	the doc Top Sec i/or rel	nument unti cret Control ease the att	l such time as it is a personnel and those ached Top Secret ma	downgraded, o individuals u iterial will sig	lestroyed, or whose official on this form	
REFERRED TO RECEIVE	ved RELEASED 25X1A						SEEN BY		
OFFICE 25X1A SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	20/(1/(	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/D	IV. DATE	
O/DDI	30 Sec	74	<u>30 S</u>	ep 74			SALT	30ct7	
SALT Suppo				'		•			
Staff									
	I Oct	74							
					<del> </del>		<u> </u>		
Ì									
					-				
·			İ						
			<del>                                     </del>						
			<u> </u>	ļ. <u> —</u>					
	į								
			<del> </del>	ļ					
		-,	<del>                                     </del>	<del> </del>					
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this found transmitted to Central Top Secret Co			Top Sec	eret mat	erial it shal	l be completed in the	appropriate :	spaces below	
D OWNGR AD ED	DESTROYED BY (Signature) TO						DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)		
TO ·						то			
BY (Signature)	WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY					BY (Signature)	(Signature)		
722722			<u>.</u>	Т		OFFICE		ATE	
OFFICE Approved For F	OFFICE Release 20	01/09/	05 : CI	A-RDI		0FF1CE 35A0004000400		A16	